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Florence Thépot1 
 
The industries of online search and social networking are characterised by high 
market shares held by a very limited number of actors. Google holds 85% of the 
market for Internet search engines in terms of traffic, and has been maintaining its 
market share at this level since 2008. Eight years after its creation, the social-
networking website Facebook has 800 million active users in 2012, accounting for 
about 65% of the market share of social-networking websites, in terms of registered 
users. As advertised-based media, search engines and social-networking websites 
have the characteristics of a special type of market known as two-sided markets or 
platforms. Two-sided markets are platforms which have two distinct user groups 
providing each other with network benefits. The platforms enable the user groups to 
minimise the transaction costs they would have otherwise incurred, of searching for 
each other and interacting. Economics of two-sided markets cannot be ignored by 
competition authorities in assessing market power in the search and social 
networking industries. The paper provides a framework for defining the relevant 
market and for assessing market power in the industries of online search and social-
networking websites, focusing on the current leaders Google and Facebook. It is 
argued that online-search and social-networking websites may exert competitive 
constraints on each other, as both operate in the relevant market for ‘monetization of 
user’s information by online advertising’.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The fast-evolving markets for online search and social networking are characterised 
by high market shares held by a very limited number of competitors. Eight years after 
its creation, the social-networking website Facebook has 800 million active users in 
2012, accounting for about 65% of the market share of social-networking websites in 
the US.2 Google holds around 88% of the global market for Internet searches, and 
has been maintaining its market share at this level since 2008.3 On-going EU and US 
investigations show that dominance in these markets may raise competition 
concerns: for instance, Google has recently been investigated by the European 
Commission for allegation of abuse of its dominant position relating to alleged 
                                                          
1
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unfavourable treatment of search services companies.4 The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) opened a formal investigation against Google concerning similar 
allegations.5  
 
While opening the probe against Google, the European Commission acknowledged 
the difficulty of establishing dominance in the Internet search market due to the 
particular nature of Google’s business.6 Indeed, search engines and social-
networking websites have the characteristics of a special type of market known as 
two-sided markets or platforms. Two-sided markets are platforms which have two 
distinct user groups providing each other with network benefits. The platforms 
provide a meeting place to two groups or parties, and enable them to minimise the 
transaction costs they would have otherwise incurred, of searching for each other 
and interacting.7 To do so, such platforms may engage in matchmaking or building 
audiences.8 
 
Google, as other search engine portals, acts as an intermediary between advertisers 
and users. Google provides a service that attracts users who form an audience that 
in turn attracts the advertisers. As with other advertising-supported media, Google 
earns all of its revenues from advertisers.9 Social-networking websites, such as 
Facebook, engage in building an audience and are mostly advertising-based, while 
their core function for the users is also to be an exchange platform. 
 
Common features of two-sided markets are that each group on one side of the 
platform tends to realize more value when there are more users on the other side. 
For example, the interest of using social-networking websites for users increases the 
more groups of people use it too as it saves the cost of interacting with these people 
on bilateral basis.10 Two-sided markets are characterised by indirect network 
externalities that the platform helps internalise. Prices and profits are linked on the 
two sides and each side of the platform exerts some constraint on the other.11 This 
has practical implications in terms of market definition and assessment of market 
power: for example, the market has to be defined in relation to the other side of the 
market; the feedback effects between the two markets need to be accounted for in 
                                                          
4
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7
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8
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terms of prices and profits, and the barriers to entry have to be assessed differently.12 
Ignoring the specificities of such markets may yield erroneous conclusions in 
competition analysis.13 
 
In addition to being two-sided platforms, social-networking and search websites have 
common and special features such as being advertised and running as web-based 
media. Moreover, both industries seem to be currently led by ‘winner-takes-all’ 
companies, respectively Facebook and Google. This makes it relevant to analyse 
both industries alongside each other, with their special features demanding extra 
care in the assessment of market power. 
 
In this paper, it is argued that the economics of two-sided markets cannot be ignored 
by competition authorities when dealing with search and social networking industries. 
After evaluating the economic foundations that are useful in this case, the different 
characteristics of the search and social-networking websites as platforms for two-
sided markets will be established, focusing on the current market leaders Google and 
Facebook. The paper will provide a framework for assessing market power in the 
markets for search and social-networking websites, encompassing an assessment of 
relevant Commission decisions.14 The issue of search bias, predominant in the 
current investigation on Google’s alleged abuse of dominance, as well as the issue of 
overall consumer welfare are outside the scope of this paper. 
 
 
2. Search and social-networking websites: example of two-sided platforms. 
 
 
2.1. Two-sided markets: some economics 
 
The economics of two-sided markets appeared with the works of among others, 
Caillaud and Jullien,15 Rochet and Tirole,16 Evans and Schmalensee,17 and 
Armstrong.18 Two-sided markets comprise an intermediary whose role is to act as a 
platform between two distinct markets. The two different markets produce indirect 
network effects on each other, and each side is linked with a feedback effect. A 
common example of two-sided markets would be a heterosexual dating club. Men 
value the club only if women come to the club, and vice versa. The platform, here the 
dating club, enables both group of customers, men and women, to interact and 
search for each other. The platform helps economize the searching cost incurred 
                                                          
12
 Ibid. 
13
 For an account of the fallacies that arise from using the one-sided market logic in assessing two-
sided markets, see: J. Wright, One-Sided Logic in Two-Sided Markets (2003) AEI-Brookings Joint 
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15
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'Chicken & egg: competition among intermediation service providers' (2003) 34 RAND Journal of 
Economics 309.  
16
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18
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compared with if the men and women were to operate on a bilateral basis. The 
platform also helps get the balance right between the two groups of users via its 
pricing strategy. Charging the women a lower entry fee than the men is an example 
of price structure commonly adopted in dating clubs.  
 
A two-sided market exists if two groups of agents interact via an intermediary, and if 
the decisions of each group impact the outcomes on the two sides, typically through 
an externality, such as a network effect.19 In economic terms, there is a two-sided 
market if two groups of consumers are linked by an externality and if they cannot 
internalise it on a bilateral basis due to high transaction costs.20 In two-sided markets, 
the price-cost mark-up does not just depend on the elasticity of demand and marginal 
cost, but also on the elasticity of demand on the other side, as well as on the price-
cost mark-up charged.21 
 
These conditions make two-sided markets different from other markets even if in 
most markets, parties interact via an intermediary too. In these markets, such as the 
wheat market, the price structure does not matter in terms of optimal outcome. A tax 
levied on a buyer will have the same effect as a tax levied on a seller. In contrast, the 
price structure in a dating club matters: a lower price for women than for men brings 
a higher outcome, which equally matters as the price level. Similarly, there might not 
be such interdependence between the two sides of the intermediary in a one-sided 
market. The profit of a farmer selling once wheat to an intermediary - e.g. a grocery - 
may not be linked to the profit of the grocery selling the good. In that case, the 
conditions for a two-sided market are not fulfilled in spite of the existence of an 
intermediary.22 
 
The intermediary or platform plays an essential role in two-sided markets: that of 
internalising the externalities, and diminishing transaction costs between the two 
groups of users. To do so, platforms may engage in matchmaking users, such as in 
exchange platforms. Another type of two-sided market is advertising-based media. 
Such media acts as a platform between users and advertisers. They engage in 
building an audience to make available to a pool of advertisers. Web portals, 
including online search and social networking websites are example of advertised-
based media. As operating with two markets, the platform must follow a different 
profit-maximising approach than a traditional business. The platform has to account 
for the demand of each side of the platform, and the effect the demand of one side 
has on the other side. Similarly, the platform must take into account the costs 
attributed to each side, as well as the costs of running the platform.23  
 
Taking into account two-sided market characteristics is of fundamental importance 
when undertaking a competitive assessment. Not doing so, a competitive 
                                                          
19
 M. Rysman, 'The Economics of Two-Sided Markets' (2009) 23 Journal of Economic Perspectives 
125. 
20
 D. S. Evans and R. Schmalensee (n 8) 154. 
21
 M. Rysman (n 19) 129. 
22
 Ibid, 126. 
23
 D. S. Evans, 'Two-Sided Market Definition', in Market Definition in Antitrust: Theory and Case 
Studies (chapter XII, ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 2009)7.  
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assessment might fall into various fallacies, identified by Wright.24 A first erroneous 
conclusion induced by using a one-sided approach to a two-sided market is that a 
price structure must reflect relative costs, in the logic that users must pay to cover the 
costs. However, in the example of the night club, the men do not pay in relation to the 
cost of using the club, but in relation to the surplus they derive from an additional 
woman on the other side of the platform.  The price does not necessarily reflect the 
cost of use, but it can still be a competitive market. Related to this issue, a high price-
cost margin does not necessarily indicate the existence of market power. Similarly, a 
below-cost pricing does not necessarily stem from a predatory pricing strategy.  
 
Another one-sided fallacy is to think that more competition can impact on the price 
structure. It is likely that a monopolist night club will price the same way as many 
clubs competing fiercely with each other: higher price for men than for women. More 
competition will certainly drive the price level down, but is unlikely to bring a more 
efficient price structure. Also, it would be incorrect to consider the price structure as a 
cross-subsidy between the two sides of the market. This would ignore the indirect 
network effect at stake: in the night club example, the participation of men depends 
on the participation of women. As a result, the revenue to the club associated with an 
additional woman generates the revenue associated with an additional man, which 
amounts to the total revenue gained by the club. Each customer therefore triggers 
revenue that covers more than the incremental cost. In contrast, a cross-subsidy 
implies that one side produces a gain below the incremental cost of its participation, 
and that the whole platform would be better off without their participation, in terms of 
revenue, which is not the case in terms of two-sided markets.25  
 
2.2. Google and Facebook, platforms of two-sided markets. 
 
2.2.1. Online search and its current market leader, Google. 
 
Over the last 15 years, the business of online search has grown very rapidly in line 
with the general development of the Internet, if not faster. Finding a piece of 
information among the immense quantity of data available on the Internet has 
become tremendously important if not the core tool of Internet users. At the end of 
the 1990s, Google emerged in the online search landscape, with a reputation for 
producing more relevant results than the existing search engines, its algorithm being 
based both on text matching and on ‘reputation’, a proxy for the quality of the web 
page.26 Just two years after its launch, Google accounted for 7 million searches per 
day. Today its revenue amounts to $12.21 billion for the quarter ending 30 June 
2012,27 and it holds around 85% of the market for online search. The use of the 
search engine is free to users. Online search companies fund their system with 
advertising revenues. They sell companies advertising space alongside search 
results, tailored to the keywords of the search being conducted. On Google, two 
                                                          
24
 J. Wright (n 13). 
25
 Ibid 2-9. 
26
 S. Brin and L. Page, 'The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Search Engine' (1998) Computer 
Science Dep’t, Stanford Univ. (1998), http://infolab.stanford.edu/pub/papers/ google.pdf   
27
 Google, Google Announces Second Quarter 2012 Financial Results. Available 
at:http://investor.google.com/earnings/2012/Q2_google_earnings.html  (retrieved 09/10/2012).  
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types of result appear as the outcome of a search query: the list of websites as 
‘organic’ results, and the corresponding list of ads that have been paid for by 
advertisers. In other words, Google attracts traffic with its search functionality and 
sells the traffic’s ‘attention’ to advertisers as a way to generate its revenues.  
 
 
2.2.2. Social networking and its current market leader, Facebook. 
 
Social networking websites provide an array of means for users to interact and 
socialize with one another: the facilities offered include traditional internet 
communication such as messaging and email, as well as the possibility to share 
pictures, videos and files.  In addition, social networking websites are used for 
blogging, discussion groups, among other interaction means.28 Facebook, created in 
2004, is a market leader in this industry, with a market share of 65% of social 
networking users in 2011. Other examples include websites such as Twitter (micro-
blogging), LinkedIn (professional network), or MySpace (music). Facebook derives its 
revenues from advertising. Unlike other advertising-based media, users themselves 
create the content that attracts traffic, which in turns attracts the advertisers. 
Facebook’s platform also supports other web-firms via the various applications it 
hosts.29 
 
 
2.2.3. Why are Google and Facebook two-sided platforms? 
 
 
Google and Facebook are both advertising-based media. As with many web portals, 
advertising is used to fund the system offered to users for free. Both operate as the 
intermediary between two groups of agents: in one side, the web surfers that make 
search queries or use the social networking content. On the other side, they operate 
with a wide range of advertisers.  
 
In economics terms, Google and Facebook intermediate the transactions between 
the users and advertisers helping internalise the network externalities. They enable 
exchanges to be realised, which may not otherwise occur.30 To some extent they 
provide the ‘liquidity’ of the market by increasing the volume of buyers and sellers 
that can achieve mutually profitable transactions. Absent a certain amount of liquidity, 
the market may be too narrow and unsustainable.31  
 
 Google: Search-based advertising  
 
                                                          
28
 D R Gnyawali, W Fan, J Penner, 'Competitive Actions and Dynamics in the Digital Age: An Empirical 
Investigation of Social Net' (2010) 21 Information Systems Research 595-596 in S. Weber Waller, 
Antitrust and Social Networking (2012) North Carolina Law Review 6.  
29
 D. S. Evans, 'Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging Global Internet Economy' (2008) 102 
Northwestern University Law Review 291. 
30
 D. S. Evans & R. Schmalensee (n 8) 152.   
31
 D. S. Evans, 'The Economics of the Online Advertising Industry' (2008) 7 Review of Network 
Economics 372. 
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Google attracts users with its search tool, as well as with other functionalities such as 
email, maps, videos, and as the owner of YouTube. We focus here on the search 
functionality offered by Google. In turn, Google's users, attracted by the content, 
attract advertisers to whom Google sells advertising space. More advertisers on one 
side and more users on the other side may increase the likelihood of beneficial 
matches between the users and the advertisers, which is the case for exchange 
platforms.32 If verified, this illustrates the indirect network effect between the two 
sides of the platform. If this is the case, the nature of this indirect network effect 
needs more attention. 
 
The advertisers value the user side of the platform as users constitute an audience 
pool for the advertisements. The larger the platform is, the more interesting it gets for 
the advertisers as there are higher chances that purchases will be undertaken by the 
users. It is not as clear that users value the other side of the platform as much as the 
advertisers do. Users may value the online search more if it provides advertisements 
that are relevant to the query, providing that they wish to purchase something.33 In 
that situation the question is whether more advertisers on one side bring more 
relevant advertisements to the users. This seems to be true, especially for narrowly 
advertised markets, for which a larger advertiser base makes a difference to the 
users’ value. If there is no purchase intention, the users may stop using the website if 
there are too many advertisements. However, the platform may ‘internalise’ the cost 
of viewing ads by offering the service for free. In other words, advertisements 
disturbance might be seen as the non-price fee borne by the users.34 Moreover, 
increased advertising enables Google to fund the refinement and development of the 
organic search functionality, and helps Google provide more free functionalities on 
top of the search engine (email, video and picture storage and so on).35  
 
Google also enables people to look for web-based businesses which appear in the 
list of organic search results. These businesses, which include other publishers, do 
not pay for their ads to be displayed and benefit from the platform. Other web 
publishers also subscribe to Google's advertising services. They allow Google for 
some space to insert its ads, for which the publishers receive a part of Google's 
revenue.36 As such Google interacts with different actors that are themselves two-
sided platforms: one example being social-networking websites.  
 
Facebook: non-search advertising 
 
Facebook attracts users with its social-networking system. It does not create content, 
but provides the framework for the creation of content by the users themselves 
(although the applications and other functionalities also constitute content). The 
content created by the users constitutes a pool of data that is used to attract the 
advertisers. The advertisers can use Facebook for their advertisements in different 
                                                          
32
 Ibid.  
33
 D. S. Evans  (n 31) 293. 
34
 D. S. Evans & R. Schmalensee (n 7) 670-671. 
35
 K. Laudadio Devine, 'Preserving Competition in Multi-Sided Innovative Markets: How Do you Solve a 
Problem Like Google?' (2008) 10 North Carolina Journal of Law & Techology 83. 
36
 D. S. Evans (n 31) 296. 
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ways: by creating a page for the brand advertised, by purchasing advertising space 
which will be displayed on Facebook's website and by buying 'sponsored stories' as 
well as embedding Facebook functionalities on the business' own website. When 
purchasing advertising space, the advertisers can select the audience to target, 
according to data available on age, location and so on. Facebook's functionality 
enables advertisers and potential buyers to increase the chance of matching their 
interest mutually and profitably. 
 
 Facebook also offers to display advertisements by the way of 'sponsored stories'. 
Sponsored stories are conveyed by users which interact on Facebook with the 
business's page or application: the story comprises the action of the user in relation 
to the business such as 'Martin is having coffee at Starbucks', as well as the picture 
brand and link to the business page. The picture constitutes the advertisement for 
which the business pays for. The advertisement is then conveyed by an individual 
user to all of his contacts.37 From the advertisers' perspective this is a very powerful 
way of leveraging the networks of its customers/subscribers. Sponsored stories also 
entail recommendations by users that convey stories. The question of benefits to the 
user is similar to search-based advertising. The larger the pool of advertisers and 
users, the greater is the chance of a successful transaction. The users might be 
disturbed by the display of advertisements, in spite of their being relevant to their 
profile. In the case of the sponsored stories, the user's experience of the 
advertisements might be quite different. In that case, the advertisement becomes 
user content, sent by the user to their contacts. Users might value sponsored stories 
the same way they value non-sponsored stories published by their contacts. How 
they value this relates to the concept of network effects characterising all networks: 
each user values the system the more users there are, and the more they produce 
content. While the network effect can be limited by capacity constraints, or 
congestion, such limits do not seem to affect Facebook, which is still seeing its 
number of registered users grow. The settings of the system allow each user to 
select the users they wish to interact with, and the amount of information they want to 
see from each user, which helps reduce the potential cost to users of a too large and 
intense network.   
 
Both platforms face a ‘chicken and egg’ issue in operating with two groups of 
consumers.38 Advertisers have no incentive to buy advertising space if the users are 
not yet on board on the other side. The other side is the source of revenue attached 
to the transaction. Similarly, an absence of advertisers will decrease the value of the 
platform to the users, if this implies that the users have to pay for use. This is the 
characteristic of indirect network effects between markets whose participation affects 
each other’s participation. More participants on one side induce more participants to 
join the other side of the platform. This positive feedback effect may well affect the 
market structure and the type of competition which then prevails. Large platforms 
usually see this pattern, as they are deemed to bring higher benefits to advertisers 
and users. The market for online advertising is populated by numerous platforms, but 
characterised by a few very large market leaders in their categories (online search, 
                                                          
37
 Facebook, Sponsored Stories for Marketplace. Available at: 
https://www.facebook.com/ads/stories/SponsoredStoriesGuide_Oct2011.pdf (retrieved 13/01/2012). 
38
 B. Caillaud et B. Jullien (n 15). 
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social networking). Each category of online-based advertising is characterised by the 
domination of one platform, which can vary across countries.39 For example, Google 
is the leader in western countries, while Baidu holds most of the Chinese online 
search market.40  
 
In summary, Google and Facebook are example of platforms of two-sided markets, 
characterised by indirect network effects which they help internalise, so as to bring 
value to both advertisers and users. The market structure in which both market 
leaders operate can be related to the existence of two-sided markets. In the case of 
Facebook, this is combined with the usual direct network effect that features each 
social-networking. In order to assess market power, the subtleties linked to these 
characteristics must be accounted for in order to avoid erroneous conclusions.  
 
 
3. A framework for assessing market power. 
 
We now turn to the actual analysis that must be realised by competition authorities in 
order to assess market power in such markets. The analysis encompasses several 
steps: the first stage is the market definition that is used to calculate market shares in 
the relevant market. Then the market share must be put in relation with the potential 
competitive constraints that determine market power, including the contestability of 
the market, the existence of barriers to entry and exit for new competitors, as well as 
the possibility of consumers to switch to another service. All these steps will be 
analysed in the light of two-sided markets economics. We will first examine market 
definition issues (3.1), before turning to competitive constraints (3.2) in the market for 
social-networking and online search.  
 
 
3.1. Market definition 
 
Competition authorities start their enquiry with market definition in the context of 
abuse of dominance41 and merger control procedures42. A first aim is to delineate the 
scope of the enquiry, in order to limit it to a manageable set of relevant products and 
companies. The relevant market includes all the products with which the product at 
stake may compete, with which there is a sufficient degree of substitutability. 
Substitution, which can come from the demand as well as from the supply side of the 
product, is a key concept in this respect. If from the consumer's perspective a 
competitor’s good is a very good substitute for the product at stake, the demand 
elasticity is likely to be high, and therefore the company will not manage to raise the 
price sustainably, as the consumer has the possibility to switch to another product. 
This rationale underpins the test used by most competition authorities to define the 
relevant market, namely the Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in 
                                                          
39
  D. S. Evans (n 31) 298.  
40
 Simon Montlake, ‘China's Qihoo 360 Takes Aim At Baidu's Search 'Monopoly'’, Forbes, 31/08/2012 
41
 Article 102, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
[2010] OJ C 83/01.  
42
  Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) [2004]OJ L 24.  
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Price or SSNIP test. In this test, we look at the effect of a price increase of a 5 to 
10% on the profit of the industry. If this price increase triggers a loss due to a lower 
demand, it means that the product has available substitutes that need to be included 
in the relevant market. If the price increase induces increased revenue, there is a 
lack of available substitute elsewhere, which shows that this is a relevant market that 
is ‘worth monopolizing’ by a hypothetical monopolist.43 The SSNIP test is used both 
in abuse of dominance and merger control cases.44 The larger the relevant market, 
the less likely dominance will be found in that market.  
 
The particularities of two-sided markets have several practical impacts with respect to 
market definition. First, there is more than one market to examine, as there are two 
sides to the platform. Secondly, the tools used in traditional markets must be used 
with care, so as to account for the feedback effect between the two sides. The 
elasticities of demand of the two sides are intertwined, therefore a hypothetical 
increase in price on one side cannot be analysed in isolation to its effect on the other 
side. We will first analyse the definition issues in the two sides taken separately 
before turning to the tools used to define the relevant market of the platform as a 
whole.  
 
 
3.1.1. Market definition on one side: the functionality offered to users 
(online search, social-networking) 
 
We will consider the potential definition issues of the user side of the platform, first of 
the online search websites, and then of the social-networking websites. We will 
illustrate by focusing on the market leaders, Google and Facebook.  
 
3.1.1.1. Online search. 
 
From the user side perspective, Google provides a functionality for online searches, 
together with offering various functionalities, such as map services, email and 
messenger tools, as well as video service since its acquisition of YouTube. In this 
paper we focus our analysis on the search functionality offered by Google. A search 
engine is a “computer program that searches databases and Internet sites for the 
documents containing keywords specified by a user.” 45 In its decision 
Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, the European Commission describes it as a 
 
[A] tool designed to search for information on the Internet. It consists of a 
search box in which queries can be typed. The search results of a given query 
are then usually presented in a ranked list of results. The information 
searched for may consist of text (including news), maps, images, videos or 
other types of content.46 
                                                          
43
 S. Bishop and M. Walker, Economics of E.C. Competition Law: Concepts, Application and 
Measurement (Sweet & Maxwell, 2009). 
44
 In one-sided logic a number of caveats of the SSNIP test are identified: the cellophane fallacy, 
teethless fallacy etc, which do not touch upon the themes of this paper.  
45
 Business dictionary online, retrieved 13/01/2012 
46
  DG COMP, M.5727, para. 30. 
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From the user viewpoint, the 'search engine' offered by Google has as substitute all 
similar functionalities available to users on the web offered by other providers, such 
as Bing, Yahoo, Baidu, Ask and so on. Those general search engines must be 
distinguished from vertical search engines which focus 
 
on specific segments of online content such as for example legal, medical, or 
travel search engines. Contrary to general Internet search engines, which 
index large portions of the Internet through a web crawler, vertical search 
engines typically use a focused crawler that indexes only web pages that are 
relevant to a pre-defined topic or set of topics.47 
 
The Commission also held that general search engines must be distinguished from 
search tools integrated into websites, which enable users to search for content within 
a website.  
 
The search engine industry is highly concentrated. Looking at market shares, based 
on web traffic (views of a website), Google clearly leads its competitors.48 
Interestingly, Facebook appears in some market share rankings for online search, 
with 1.43% of market share for the US market.49 Similar to many websites, Facebook 
integrates a search tool for users to find contacts or content. In addition, there is now 
a directory for contacts, places and businesses that is publicly available. It can be 
seen as a way for Facebook 'to challenge third-party search engines as the preferred 
way to find information about businesses. This is because advertisers are willing to 
pay higher prices to appear when users are making decisions about which local 
business or restaurant to visit.'50  For now it seems that it would not be appropriate to 
place Facebook's search tool in the same market as general search engines, but the 
dynamics of such industry might well change this in the future.  
 
Another aspect is whether there is a substitute available to users in the 'brick and 
mortar' market. This expression refers to the 'offline' version of a service offered on 
the Internet. Online search is very specific and inherent to the development of the 
Internet and to the information that is available. Search engine can be seen as 
providing a one-stop shop to services that may also be available offline, such as 
search engine rather than library for information research, searching for flights online 
rather than going to a travel agency and so on. This is of course not specific to online 
search, as the whole economy is increasingly populated by online counterparts of 
businesses. Therefore, from the user perspective there is no substitute to engine 
search in the 'brick and mortar' market.  
 
Even if from the user's viewpoint, the 'product' seems to be all general search 
engines, from an antitrust point of view, it is incomplete to consider Google as 
                                                          
47
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exclusively operating in the relevant market for online search. It ignores the other 
side of the platform, and the interrelations between both. In its decision, the 
Commission described the online search product, but correctly considered the 
relevant market to be in the field of advertising.51  
 
 
3.1.1.2. Social-networking. 
 
Social networking web portals, previously defined as providers of an array of means 
for users to interact and socialize with one another - messaging, email, pictures, 
videos, file sharing, blogging, discussion groups - can encompass many different 
type of web portals. Under this definition of social networking, Facebook has a 
leading position in the category, as it offers all the services described. Other websites 
offer a similar range of functionalities such as Google+, LinkedIn or Twitter. These 
websites are focused on the identity of people, and the interaction among them. 
Other social-networking websites may be more centred on specific interests, such as 
music or news, but there are no borders that can be drawn between different 
categories as most social-networking websites also enable people to connect via 
their specific interest.  
 
As for substitutability, we leave aside for now the fact that the use of one website is 
not exclusive from the use of another website. We theoretically ask the question of 
choices available to consumers, should the access to one of the website be 
constrained. This might include the introduction of an access fee, or stricter 
registration requirement. What would happen if Facebook were to restrain access to 
a category of people, as was seen when it originally only provided access to the 
students of some American colleges? This is more than theoretical and does not 
really fit the SSNIP test, as not relating to a small increase in price, but this does give 
an idea of the concept of substitution we are using here. Some websites can fall 
under the definition of social-networking websites: Groupon, offering discounts, 
Amazon, the retail website, as well as YouTube. However, they appear to be only 
partial substitutes to social networking such as Facebook, as they only provide one 
part of its functionality. This view was adopted in the US case LiveUniverse v. 
Myspace,52 in which the District Court distinguished dating website from general 
social-networking websites. The Court concluded that MySpace operated in the 
relevant market for Internet-based social networking website. If their definition of 
social-networking seems appropriate, we don't subscribe to how the market is 
defined as not accounting for the two-sides of the market. 
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Social-networking websites such as Facebook do not have counterparts in the 'offline' 
life. Many 'brick and mortar' businesses provide places where people gather and 
exchange according to their identity and interest. Those places may operate as a 
platform between different groups of users, and help internalise indirect network 
effect, as do social networking websites. However, social networking websites 
provide a very distinct experience to users, specific to their online nature. The means 
of communications are numerous and online-related. On top of this, Facebook 
provides various types of communication means that can apply to different segments: 
professional networking, hobbies, specific interest, charity management etc. In other 
words, Facebook has a potential to be used in relation with every dimension of 
peoples’ lives, which can make it a large one-stop platform for users. Such equivalent 
cannot be found in the 'brick and mortar' market.  
 
3.1.1.3. On the other side: advertisers  
 
Both Facebook and Google earn their revenues from the other side of the platform 
they operate, namely advertising. Online advertising-based companies have already 
been the focus of competition decisions, in which market definition in the field was 
approached. A first set of issues in this respect relates to whether online and offline 
advertising, such as newspaper advertising, belong to the same relevant market. In 
the context of Google and search-based advertising, the question is also whether 
non-sponsored advertising can compete with sponsored ads.  
 
Online and offline advertising pursue similar objectives, namely, to 'inform, persuade, 
remind or motivate consumers by delivering information, rhetoric, and/or imagery to 
those consumers.'53  Every means of reaching the targeted audience has its own 
characteristics and offers different functionalities to both advertisers and users. The 
question is thus from an advertiser point of view whether the offline environment can 
be a substitute to the online? To what extent do both sides exert competitive 
constraints on each other? Would it be sufficient to group them in the same relevant 
market?  
 
We will first consider the potential constraint exerted by online advertising on offline 
advertising. Before the rise of the Internet, online advertising had very little potential 
to constrain the more traditional and long-established means of advertising, such as 
radio, TV newspapers or ‘snail mail’. The audience reachable online was too narrow, 
thus the advertisers had very little incentive to spend budgets towards online 
advertising. Nowadays, the Internet's audience is global, offering a great potential for 
advertisers. Internet advertising represented 10.6% of all advertising expenditures in 
the US, and was expected to reach 13.6% by 2012.54 A shift in expenditure from 
newspapers to online advertising was expected to occur from 2007 to 2012, 
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accompanying a decrease in the readership of those newspapers.55 These figures 
show that a shift from offline to online stems from a shift of the audience from offline 
to online media. This does not indicate on the substitutability between online and 
offline advertising, in the event an offline media raises its advertising prices. The 
constraint on price has been recognised in a US court decision, in which the alleged 
newspaper advertising market was deemed to be too narrowly defined because it did 
not include non-print media advertising.56  
 
As for the constraint exerted by the online market on the offline market, it seems that 
both will continue to compete. The decrease in newspaper readership is only one 
aspect of offline advertising as it includes also TV and radio; this part of offline 
advertising will evolve as being no longer a competitive constraint to online 
advertising. Some empirical studies approached the difficult question of 
substitutability. In the study 'Advertising Bans and the Substitutability of Online and 
Offline Advertising’, the authors analysed whether Internet advertising is more 
effective in places that prohibit advertisements for alcohol displayed on billboards.57 
By doing this, they are able to compare the effectiveness of online ads when there is 
no offline competition, with its effectiveness when offline competition is possible. The 
results show that offline advertising constrains the effectiveness of online advertising. 
The authors acknowledge that their study does not comprise any pricing dimension, 
but this still provides a robust result in terms of substitutability. 
 
Another other study from the same authors, entitled 'Search Engine Advertising: 
Substitution when Pricing Ads to Context' focused on search-based advertising, 
examining how offline advertising impacts the price of search-based advertising. In 
some US states, lawyers cannot contact by post a client victim of an injury before a 
certain period after the accident. During this time, competition between online and 
offline legal advertising can be deemed to be absent. The authors compared the 
prices for online advertising associated with the keyword “brain injury attorney Baton 
Rouge” with the price of an advertising related to the search “divorce attorney Baton 
Rouge”. In the states with solicitation restrictions, the model shows that personal 
injury keywords were relatively more expensive to the price of other legal keywords, 
in comparison with the price gap between the same keywords in states without 
regulation prohibiting such contact. These results may not be fully consistent to 
define the relevant market for antitrust purposes, as the SSNIP test analyses the 
response to a small price increase, not to an access ban to the market. Therefore 
this study highlights the potential constraint effect of offline advertising on online 
advertising, as the price of online advertising is higher in the absence of offline 
advertising.58  
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The European Commission considered whether offline and online advertising could 
be in the same relevant market in various decisions.59 In all its decisions, the 
Commission found a separate market for the online advertising. In Telia/Telenor, the 
parties submitted that from the demand-side perspective, companies did not 
exclusively advertise online, and that the advertising activity also encompassed the 
offline channels. The Commission rejected this statement, stating that this was 
related to the advertising strategy pursued by companies, to advertise via various 
channels. With Google/DoubleClick, the Commission distinguished the offline from 
online advertising markets because of the different characteristics of advertising 
through these channels: differences in potential scope of targeted audience and in 
the assessment of advertisements’ effectiveness; different pricing mechanism as in 
online advertising prices connect the cost and the reach of the advertisement, which 
is not the case in offline mechanism. In establishing a distinction between online and 
offline advertising, the Commission failed to account for the potential competitive 
constraints and related substitution between offline and online advertising. However it 
is unlikely that the authorities will reverse their findings as such approach has been 
adopted consistently over past decisions.  
 
We now consider another market definition issue, within the market of online-
advertising: whether non-search advertising may constrain search-advertising. 
Search advertisements appear aside the organic search results, and are associated 
with keywords that the advertiser has selected. In contrast, non-search 
advertisements appear on a website without being related to a specific keyword. 
From the advertisers’ viewpoint, search-advertising may seem to produce a more 
targeted advertising, and increase the relevance of advertising. Search engines can 
save keywords searched by a same user in the recent past. For instance Google now 
uses interest-based advertising, aiming to show ads relevant to the websites visited 
previously.60 This enable to gather information about the needs of the user, based on 
the keyword search and on previous websites visited. 
 
Non-search advertising may gather a great amount of information on viewers, which 
allow to achieve a targeting of equivalent efficiency. A website, on which non-search 
advertisements are displayed, attracts a segmented type of viewers with a specific 
interest, which is likely to correspond to a particular gender, age category.  
Geographic information can be inferred from the viewer’s IP address.61 Websites 
which require users to register can collect even more detailed valuable information. 
Facebook is obviously one of those websites which gather a large amount of 
information, potentially on every dimension of a viewer's identity, activities and 
interests. From an advertiser's perspective, search-advertisements and non-search 
advertisements can reach a very targeted audience. They probably target the 
audience differently as a search engine has highly relevant information on the 
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searcher’s current needs, and a social-networking website provides detailed 
information about the user's identity and interest.62 
 
With Google/DoubleClick and Microsoft/Yahoo! Search business the Commission 
approached such issues without reaching definite conclusions. In 
Google/DoubleClick, the market investigation showed that the different forms of 
online advertisements can constitute substitutes for the advertiser, as differences of 
technicalities and aims (brand awareness can be created by both types) between 
both tend to diminish.63 The Commission also considered the supply-side 
substitutability to conclude that both channels of advertising were not likely to be part 
of the same relevant market. A publisher cannot replace space sold for non-search 
by space sold for search-ads, and vice versa. A publisher can integrate a search tool 
on its website and share profits with the search engine provider, but this does not 
fulfil the conditions for a supply-side substitution. Moreover,  
  
[W]hen a publisher decides to allocate a given space on a web page to a non-
search (e.g.display) ad, this would not be substitutable with a "search 
generated" advertising space, since the latter only appears on the page 
generated by the search query entered by the user.64 
 
In the corresponding decision in the US, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) stated 
that search-advertising and non-search advertising could not belong to the same 
relevant market: 
 
[T]he evidence in this case shows that the advertising space sold by search 
engines is not a substitute for space sold directly or indirectly by publishers or 
vice versa. Or, to put it in terms of merger analysis, the evidence shows that 
the sale of search advertising does not operate as a significant constraint on 
the prices or quality of other online advertising sold directly or indirectly by 
publishers or vice versa.65 
 
If the demand-side substitution is verified and the supply-side is not, still we can find 
a significant competitive constraint between the prices of search and non-search 
advertisements. The differences of technicalities originating from the differences of 
type of supply do not seem to be a crucial determinant of a relevant market as long 
as advertisers are ready to use them interchangeably in case of a small price 
increase. The current evolution seems to confirm this tendency.66 Defining the search 
and non-search advertising as constituting one market has a significant implication: 
Google and Facebook potentially constrain each other, on the advertising side of the 
platform they operate. Market power of each of them would then drastically shrink 
under such definition.  
 
                                                          
62
  Ibid 18.  
63
  COMP/M.4731 Google/DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, para 52.  
64
  Ibid para. 54. 
65
 Federal Trade Commission, Statement of Federal Trade Commission Concerning 
Google/DoubleClick, (FTC File No. 071-0170) 3 and 7 (December 20, 2007) 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710170/071220statement.pdf. 
66
 D Ratliff and D. L. Rubinfeld (n 53) 18. 
 
 
18 
 
3.2.  Relevant market of the platform as a whole  
 
Now that we examined market definition issues and their implications on each side of 
the platforms, we will turn to the question of the relevant market in which Google and 
Facebook, as platforms for two-sided markets operate.  
 
The discussions developed above were necessary but insufficient in order to 
conclude as to the relevant market. Adopting a one-sided logic for a market definition 
in the case of two-sided markets is erroneous as it ignores that the platform operates 
with two-markets, whose prices and profits are linked. Economic tools usually used in 
competition enquiry are designed for the definition of single-sided markets, which 
may trigger an incorrect market definition in the case of two-sided markets. Some 
literature specifically analyses the caveat of the SSNIP test.67 An application of the 
SSNIP test on the advertising-side of the platform ran by a search-engine will 
account for competing forces exerted by other publishers on the advertising space it 
sells. This relates to the discussion above. An increase in the price of the 
advertisements has a demand and a revenue effect: the increase diverts some 
advertisers from the search website to another type of publisher, while producing a 
gain in revenue from a higher price. The loss in advertising demand incurred has an 
impact on the user side. Users may want to switch to another search engine, which 
offers more advertising supply. In turn, the loss of users further decreases the 
demand of advertisers on the other side, as their advertisements now reach a 
narrower audience. Therefore, a price increase realised in the SSNIP test can be 
deemed profitable on the advertising side, but non-profitable if accounting for the two 
sides. Suggestions as how to adjust the test, at least in theory, are available in the 
economic literature. Noel and Evans provide a two-sided extension of the SSNIP test 
that involves starting with the platform as product and adding its closest substitute.68 
The price considered would be the weighted average of the price charged in two 
sides. At each step, prices across sides and across platforms would need to be 
optimised. However this can be quite complicated in practice, especially if more than 
two sides are accounted for.69 In our situation, relying on the concept of price raises 
difficulties as one side uses the platform for free. We could easily imagine non-pricing 
elements that would divert the demand to another platform, but this might prevent the 
definition to rely on economic and numerical tools.  
 
The critical loss analysis is a method used to apply the SSNIP test in a simpler way, 
depending on the data available.  
 
It compares “Critical Loss” (CL) --the percentage loss in quantity of a 
hypothetical monopolist's products that would be exactly enough to make an 
X percent price increase in the price of all of its products unprofitable--to 
“Actual Loss” (AL) --the predicted percentage loss in quantity that the 
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monopolist would suffer if it did increase prices on all of its products by X 
percent. A relevant market is found when Actual Loss equals Critical Loss for 
a hypothetical monopolist of the given set of products in the proposed 
antitrust market. If Actual Loss exceeds Critical Loss, the relevant market is 
expanded to include more substitutes. Otherwise, it is contracted.70 
 
Noel and Evans conducted an empirical study so as to assess the potential bias in 
market definition using this tool with a one-sided rather than a two-sided logic in the 
context of the Google/DoubleClick merger decision in the US. They conclude that 
one-sided logic can lead to material errors in competition assessment. They also 
advise practitioners to avoid formalistic and systematic market definition in two-sided 
markets.71 In the case of the markets under consideration, the absence of a pricing 
element on one side of the market imposes to move away from too formalistic 
assessment. 
 
Once the pitfalls of market definition are accounted for, we will turn to suggesting 
possible market definition. The relevant approach might be to identify the group of 
customers served by the platform, its likely rivals and then identify the various 
businesses that serve these customers. The notion of substitution must be part of the 
analysis, even though it does not rely on formalistic method underpinning the SSNIP 
test.72  
 
Both types of platforms interact with multiple businesses, but we accounted for the 
sides that are common to both: the user side and the advertising side of the platform. 
For each side, we assessed the competitive constraints and specific definition issues. 
We turn to examine the different possible way of defining the relevant markets. 
 
As developed previously, it would be incorrect to define the platforms as the 
functionality they offer, namely online search and social-networking. Similarly, the 
advertising side of the platform cannot constitute a relevant market in itself as 
ignoring the user side of the platforms. In case of a merger control case, however, 
the market definition may confine to the advertising side if it is where the merging 
companies overlap, as it is the case in Google/DoubleClick.73  
 
Another way to look at market definition would be to combine both sides: Google 
would operate in the market for online-advertised based search engine, while 
Facebook would be active in the market for online-advertised based social 
networking website. However we have seen that the advertising side of both 
Facebook and Google are likely substitutes. Therefore it would seem difficult to apply 
a clear-cut distinction on competitive forces within online-advertising.  
 
Finally, some interesting approach to market definition stems from how those 
platforms monetize their operations as it gives information on ‘who the customers 
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are, whether there is competition, and whether the absence or potential absence of 
competition is a result of business acumen or anticompetitive conduct.’74 Both 
Facebook and Google monetize their operations in the form of advertising revenue. 
In the functionality we are focusing on, much of the operation consists in gathering 
and pooling information on users, relevant to the other side of the platform and to the 
platform as a whole.75 Therefore, it would be useful to consider the relevant market to 
be in the area of 'monetization of users’ information to advertisers'.76 Competition 
authorities may seem unlikely define the relevant market as broadly as suggested 
here. However, this definition can help the authorities move apart from technology 
and technicalities considerations used in market definition, so as to focus on 
competition constraints, accounting for both sides of the platforms.  
 
 
3.3. Contestability of the markets 
 
In this section, let us assume that the relevant market is defined so as Facebook and 
Google have lead market shares in their respective markets or industries. This is 
likely to be the case in antitrust decisions for the time being. In that scenario antitrust 
concerns need to consider the contestability of the market in order to conclude 
whether they actually have market power. The assessment of market shares in 
isolation of barriers to entry; consumers lock-in etc. can yield erroneous conclusions. 
Market share calculation is only one of the elements used to assess market power.  
 
3.3.1. Barriers to entry 
 
A first element to assess is the barriers to entry to potential competitors. A market in 
which high profits are made has a potential to attract new businesses who want to 
get their share of the high profits. The barriers to entry in the search advertising 
industry seem high, not just because of the cost of developing the algorithm and 
underlying technology, but because of the cost of getting users on the platform. The 
indirect network effects are strong and therefore as each side of the market grows it 
gets more difficult for new entrants to compete. New entrants do not benefit from the 
same scope of indirect effects as the incumbents.77 An entrant might be able to 
design a better algorithm and compete with Google, however Google’s current lead 
position has been maintained over the last years, and dominance is not likely to be 
questioned in the on-going investigation. 
 
The technology and resources to enter into the social-networking industry seem 
widely available. However the barriers to entry are high due to network effects of two 
types: on the user side, Facebook benefit from a strong direct network effect, as 
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more users trigger more users to join the platform. Facebook also enjoys indirect 
effect characterising two-sided markets as more users on one side induce more 
advertisers to join, with a positive feedback effect. However the social-networking 
industry is moving fast. Until a few years ago MySpace was the leader of the 
industry, also benefiting from network effects. We may see the emergence of a new 
social-networking company that would manage to find a powerful concept or 
technology to revert the tendency of Facebook’s increasing position. One of the 
characteristics of the industries based on high innovation cost is that companies 
compete for the market rather than in the market. Therefore it is useful to assess 
dominance across time rather than at a precise point in time.  
 
 
Search engines, (eg. Google) vertically integrate with the acquisition of content 
provider websites (eg. YouTube) that compete with other content providers such as 
social networks. Social-networking websites with high market shares, such as 
Facebook may hold a significant competitive advantage with having highly detailed 
and valuable information on users. Therefore, in the market for online advertising, if 
Google and Facebook are able to compete with each other, this would significantly 
reduce their market power on the online advertising market 
 
3.3.2. Consumer lock-in.  
 
 
Users on one side and advertisers on the other side do not use one but several 
websites, which is called multi-homing.78 Users may use different social-networks or 
search engines and are likely not to constrain themselves to using one. Many 
Facebook users also frequent other social-networking websites, as they do not 
necessarily focus on the same segment. The use of several search engines may be 
less frequent amongst users.  
On the advertisers side, companies are even more likely to use several and 
differentiated platforms to advertise. This may have positive effects for competitors 
with smaller market share that may benefit from the multi-homing strategies of 
advertisers. 
 
Another specificity of these industries is the non-durability of choices. Unlike the 
choice of a computer or a mobile phone, a decision to visit a search engine or to 
register to a social-networking need not be durable as it is free to users. As a result 
‘lock-in is much less likely, particularly if multi-homing is possible.’79 While 
‘competition is one click away’, as Google says,80 it seems that people remain loyal 
to the search engine they use. This is a matter of users’ preference or ‘laziness’ 
which does not relate to an effective consumer lock-in. As for Facebook, the closure 
of one’s account seems simply done, but it will be only deactivated to allow users to 
re-join at any time. Permanently deleting one’s account entails a more difficult 
procedure. The deletion is active only after two weeks of deactivation, during which 
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the user must not log in again, nor interact with its account on third-party websites.81 
This can be perceived as a switching cost to users as the procedure is not as simple 
as just 'clicking away'.  
 
Advertisers are also 'one click away' from other publishers. However, the network 
and positive feedback effects reduce the incentives to quit a very large platform, as 
they represent potential higher revenues than smaller platforms. An advertiser who 
appears in the top of the organic search result may have further reduced incentives 
to stop paying for advertising space if there is a doubt on the reliability of the 
algorithm. Google adjusts the algorithm to counter 'search engine optimization' firms 
that seek to optimize the rank of apparition of companies in the organic result by 
'tweaking keywords and web design.'82 The search bias is a core question in the 
current investigation, however there is no evidence that Google manipulates organic 
search results at the moment.   
 
 
4. Conclusions. 
 
In online-search and social-networking platforms, the assessment of market power 
must account for specificities of two-sided markets, as well as to issues specific to 
each side of the platform. We concluded that for the user side of the platforms, 
Facebook and Google do not have ‘offline’ equivalents. On the advertiser side, the 
offline market has a potential to constrain the online market but this approach does 
not seem to be adopted by competition authorities. Within the online-advertising, the 
increasing substitutability between the non-search ads and search ads implies that 
Facebook and Google could theoretically belong to the same market. This would 
considerably reduce their market power and reduce antitrust concerns. It fits the idea 
that the relevant market may be constituted by all platforms attracting advertised-
based revenues by monetising relevant information they hold on users. This 
approach shows how focusing on competitive constraints and substitution can help 
abstract from technology considerations for market definition purposes. Market power 
depends also on the existence of barriers to entry that must be put in perspective 
with the importance of network effects characterising those industries.  
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 J. Battelle, The Search: How Google and its Rivals Rewrote the Rules of Business and Transformed 
our Culture (Nicholas Brearley Publishing, 2005) in K. Laudadio Devine (n 35) 85. 
